Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2017

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. David Bryce Jones, Defendant/
Appellant : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; hosted by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Deborah L. Bulkeley, Carr Woodall PLLC; counsel for appellant.
Sean D. Reyes, Utah Attorney General's Office; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Jones, No. 20170815 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2017).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3816

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20170815 -CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID BRYCE JONES,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellant
Appeal from convictions for abuse, neglect or exploitation of a vulnerable
adult, and unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, both second degree
felonies, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable James
T. Blanch presiding.
Deborah L. Bulkeley (13653)
CARR | WOODALL, PLLC
10808 S. River Front Pkwy., Ste. 175
South Jordan, UT 84095
Telephone: 801-254-9450
Email: deborah@carrwoodall.com
Counsel for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Esq.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 4

A. STATEMENT OF FACTS. ......................................................................................... 4
B. SUMMARY OF PROCEDINGS. ................................................................................. 8
C. DISPOSITION. ...................................................................................................... 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................12
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................13

I.

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ........13

A. IT WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PLAIN ERROR TO NOT OBJECT
TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF KIMBERLY MACK AND CODY TOWER. ......................... 15
1. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to Kimberly Mack’s improper
opinion testimony. ................................................................................................... 17
2. It was objectively unreasonable to stipulate to Cody Tower’s improper opinion
testimony. ................................................................................................................ 19
3. The expert testimony presented by Ms. Mack and Mr. Tower prejudiced
Bryce........................................................................................................................ 20
B. IT WAS INEFFECTIVE TO NOT OBJECT TO 404(B) EVIDENCE DESPITE THE TRIAL
COURT’S RULING ON THE MATTER............................................................................... 21
1. It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object to the evidence
of purported prior unpaid loans............................................................................. 23

2. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to admission of the lease
agreement. .............................................................................................................. 25
3. Trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Bryce. ................................ 26
C. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR STIPULATING TO AN ERRONEOUS JURY
INSTRUCTION. ........................................................................................................... 28
1. It was unreasonable to stipulate to Jury Instruction 31 because it improperly
lowered the State’s burden of proof. ...................................................................... 29
2. There is a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury instruction impacted
the outcome. ............................................................................................................35
D. CUMULATIVE ERROR. ......................................................................................... 36
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE ABUSE
OF A VULNDERABLE ADULT STATUTE IS NOT
UNOCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ................................................... 38
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CONVICT
MR. JONES OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT ........................................ 45
IV. TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY BY NOT ARGUING
FOR MERGER OF BRYCE’S CONVICTIONS ....................................... 48
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 53

ADDENDA
Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:
Addendum D:
Addendum E:

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
Verdict Form, Sentencing Minutes, Notice of Appeal
Transcripts of improper opinion testimony
Transcripts of 404(b) ruling, testimony, and exhibits
Jury Instructions

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) .............................................. 24
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) ........................................................... 38
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) ...................................................... 14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .......................................... passim
United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008) ............................................... 39
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489
(1982) .................................................................................................................... 38
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) ................................................................ 19
State Cases
Aequitas Enters., LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, 267 P.3d 923 …
................................................................................................................................. 31
Colburn v. State, 201 So. 3d 462 (Miss. 2016) ..................................................... 41
Cuda v. State, 639 So. 2d 22 & n.1 (Fla. 1994) ..................................................... 42
Decker v. State, 66 So.3d 654 (Miss. 2011) .................................................... 41, 42
H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, 203 P.3d 943 ...................................................... 31
Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, 131 P. 3d 252 ............................................... 16
Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 285 P.3d 1133 .............................................................. 39
Ladd v. Bowers Trucking, Inc., 2011 UT App 355, 264 P.3d 752 ........................ 15
State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, 38 P.3d 982 ........................................... 32
State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, 322 P.3d 697 ...................................................... passim
State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 361 P.3d 104 ..................................................... passim
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) ............................................... 39
State v. Chuke, 2003 UT App 155, 71 P.3d 624 .................................................... 49
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162 ................................................................ 2
State v. Corona, 2018 UT App 154 ........................................................................ 23
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996) .......................................................... 49
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) .................................................... 20, 36
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987) ...................................................... 34
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ........................................ 32
State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, 424 P.3d 171 ................................................... passim
State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978) ..................................................... 24
State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, 152 P.3d 321 ............................................................. 19
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) ....................................................... 28
State v. Havatone, 2008 UT App 133, 183 P.3d 257 ............................................ 36
State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854 ................................................ 38
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) .................................................................. 49
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 ............................................................ 3
-iii-

State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, 57 P.3d 977 ............................................................... 38
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1989) ................................................ 24
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, 321 P.3d 1136 ................................................ 25, 26
State v. Leber, 2010 UT App 387, 246 P.3d 163 ................................................... 29
State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, 219 P.3d 75 ............................................... 30
State v. Merski, 123 NH 564 (NH 1983) ............................................................... 34
State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, 274 P.3d 992 ........................................ 14, 29
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ............................................. 22
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶, 33, 247 P.3d 344 ......................................................... 18
State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985) ......................................................... 33
State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 212, 94 P.3d 308 ..................................................... 14
State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, 131 P.3d 864 ....................................... 3, 49
State v. Rackham, 2016 UT App 167, ¶ 24, 381 P.3d 1161 ................................... 28
State v. Ring, 2013 UT App 98, 300 P.3d 1291 .................................................... 45
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ......................................... passim
State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, 147 P.3d 1176 ................................... 15, 18, 19
State v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247 (Del.1994) ....................................................... 42, 43
State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 344 P.3d 191 ................................................. 48
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) ................................................... 13-14
State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 318 P.3d 1221 .................................... passim
State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, 870 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 ................................. 2, 38, 39
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) ........................................................ 45
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, P, 28 P.3d 1278 ................................................... 3
State v. Winward, 904 P.2d 1188 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ...................................... 34
State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639 ....................................................... 3
State v. Yalowski, 2017 UT App 177, 404 P.3d 53 ................................................ 27
State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, 42 P.3d 1248 .................................................... 50
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
31 Del.C. § 3902 (1974) .......................................................................................... 42
Del. Code. Ann. Title 1250, § 3901 ........................................................................ 43
Fla. Code § 415.111 ................................................................................................. 42
Model Penal Code section 224.13 .......................................................................... 34
NH Rev. Stat. § 638 ............................................................................................... 34
Utah Code Ann § 77-17-13 ............................................................................... 15, 16
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 ........................................................................ 3, 48, 50
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 .................................................................................. 30
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 ............................................................................ passim
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 ................................................................................... 32
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 ........................................................................... passim
-iv-

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 ................................................................................... 1
Utah Const. art. I sec. 12 ....................................................................................... 48
U.S. Const. amend. V ............................................................................................ 48
Utah R. App. P. 24 .................................................................................................. 46
Utah R. Evid. 404 .......................................................................................... passim
Utah R. Evid. 701 .......................................................................................... 3, 15, 17
Utah R. Evid. 702 ........................................................................................... passim
Utah R. Evid. 901 ................................................................................................... 24

-v-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20170815-CA

v.
DAVID BRYCE JONES,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
INTRODUCTION
David O. Jones (“David”) and his son, David Bryce Jones (“Bryce”), always
had a close relationship, and they formed multiple businesses together over the
years. Bryce wanted nothing more than for those businesses to be profitable for
his father. Unfortunately, their most recent venture—a restaurant—was not
successful, despite Bryce working full time to make it work while also caring for
his father. While Bryce worked to open the restaurant, David became unable to
care for himself, so Bryce moved him to an assisted living facility. During that
time, following his father’s wishes and an assurance from the assisted living
facility that he could defer payments, Bryce took out loans from David to try to

salvage the business. In doing so, he did not knowingly misuse his father’s assets
or put his father at risk.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance of counsel by not

objecting to improper expert testimony by lay witnesses, and not objecting to
improper other acts evidence, and in stipulating to erroneous jury instructions,?
Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law.
See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162. To the extent any of these
issues were not invited error, they may also be reviewed for plain error.
Preservation. Ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first
time on appeal.
2.

Is the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally

vague?
Standard of Review. “A statute's constitutionality is a question of law”
reviewed “for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.” State v.
Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 29, 870 Utah Adv. Rep. 29.
Preservation. This issue was preserved by written and oral argument.
R174-184, R282-300, R304-311, R950-960.
3.

Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to send the case

to the jury?
Standard of Review. The Court gives deference to the jury’s verdict and
will reverse for insufficient evidence only if it determines that “‘reasonable minds
-2-

could not have reached the verdict.’” State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 29, 122
P.3d 639 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, P 74, 28 P.3d 1278).
Preservation. This issue was preserved at R753, 957-58. To the extent that
it was not preserved, the issue may be reviewed for ineffective assistance of
counsel and plain error. See, e.g., State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 17, 10 P.3d
346.
4.

Was it ineffective assistance of counsel to not seek to merge Bryce’s

convictions where he was convicted of two crimes for just one act?
Standard of Review. “If trial counsel fails to request the consolidation of
charges under the merger doctrine, and consolidation would be in order, trial
counsel has failed to provide effective assistance of counsel.” State v. PerezAvila, 2006 UT App 71, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 864.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513;1
Utah R. Evid. 404;
Utah R. Evid. 701;
Utah R. Evid. 702.

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Utah Code are to LexisNexis,
Lexis Advance through the 2018 Second Special Session.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts.
David Bryce Jones (“Bryce”) and his father David Jones (“David”) had a
close relationship. R802. Bryce is an only child and is devoted to his father.
R787-88, R802, 806. Bryce “loved his dad. He wanted to make him proud.”
R787, 788.
Bryce wanted to make sure David was well cared for. R785. Although
David had eight siblings, he was not very close to them, seeing them only once a
year or so at family gatherings. R599, 803. David had lost two wives to
dementia. R802-803. After David second wife died, Bryce became his main
companion. R802-803.
Bryce lived in Salt Lake City and would visit his father who lived in St.
George every month. R609, 804. The two also travelled together often. R802803. Over the years, David freely gave money to Bryce and partnered with his son
in several businesses. R804, R811. David “was always looking for the big score.”
R811.
In 2010, David—who was then 86-years-old and worried that he may
develop dementia—executed a general durable power of attorney that named
Bryce as his agent. R806; State’s Ex. 24. Around that time, David and Bryce
decided open a restaurant together. R806. The two formed an LLC and they
eventually found a location in Sugarhouse for a neighborhood pub and restaurant
they called “Brewhaha.” R806. Although David had started to show early signs
-4-

of dementia sometime in 2011, he was still living independently in St. George.
R808. He would travel to Salt Lake to check on the progress in getting the
restaurant going. R769, R784-85, 809. He went shopping, attended biweekly
temple sessions, and cooked and cleaned for himself. R813. In addition to
investing in the business, David gave Bryce money for his living expenses so that
Bryce could dedicate all his time to the restaurant. R811.
For much of 2013, Bryce was working full-time trying to get Brewhaha
open and operational. R810-811. David would visit to check on the progress.
R769, 809. Mike Davis spoke with David “on numerous occasions” in 2013 while
helping to remodel the restaurant, and also a couple times at Bryce’s house when
he had dinner there. R768-69. David would visit the construction site and would
inquire about work being done.2 R769-70, 774-75. Mr. Davis testified that David
was “coherent and lucid.” R770. Robert Eagle also met David five to ten times
while helping remodel the restaurant. R777-78. David was “supportive” of the
project and seemed “just fine” cognitively. R778. John Ross, an investor in
Brewhaha, spoke with David occasionally in fall 2013. R756-57. Mr. Ross
testified that David seemed coherent and interested in the restaurant. R756-57.
Tiffany Holcomb, Bryce’s friend who helped at Brewhaha before and after it
opened, saw David at the restaurant “[a]bout half a dozen times,” including once

Although Mr. Davis’ testimony did not provide an exact time frame he appeared
to be referring to David visiting the site in 2013, both before and after he moved
to Salt Lake. See R769-70, 774-75, 809.
2

-5-

before he moved up from St. George. R784-85. She also visited David at
Highland Cove. R784.
In late September 2013, after driving home from a vacation, David became
severely dehydrated and disoriented. R812. David was checked into the
emergency room and Bryce immediately went to see him. R812. After that
incident, David was no longer able to live independently. R813. Bryce made
arrangements for David to move to Highland Cove, an assisted living facility in
Salt Lake County. R813. He was checked in at “level A,” the least amount of care
for residents, which included medication management, and other living
assistance as needed. R525-26. After moving to Highland Cove, David remained
very interested in Brewhaha, and Bryce would take him on visits to the site.
R769-70, 774-75, 756-57, 784-85, 809, 815-816.
Brewhaha opened in mid-December, 2013, but although the DABC had
previously told Bryce that the restaurant would receive a liquor license on
Tuesday, December 16, 2013, the board instead voted to postpone the approval
for three months. R817. The partners knew that without a liquor license, the
restaurant would almost certainly fail and had to decide whether to move
forward. R817-818. In a final effort to salvage the business, Bryce spoke with
Cody Tower, Highland Cove’s general manager, who agreed to allow David to
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defer his approximately $3,000.00 monthly payments.3 R818. But in March, the
liquor license was again denied. R819. During this time, Bryce updated Mr.
Tower on the business and finances every month. R546, 825. Bryce spoke with
Mr. Tower on May 1, 2014 “per schedule.” R820. On May 23, 2014, Highland
Cove sent Bryce an eviction notice. R521, 544, 820; State’s Ex. 4.
Bryce was surprised because of his arrangement with Mr. Tower. R820-21.
He asked if starting to make payments would cancel the eviction, and was told
“yes.” R820-21. Bryce contacted Mr. Tower and made a $3,000 payment. R521,
820-21; State’s Ex. 3. He also looked into other arrangements in case his father
needed to be moved, which included daily care by certified nurse assistants.
R786, 823. However, when Bryce told Mr. Tower that he could move David out,
Mr. Tower said there would be no need to do that because Highland Cove work
with him on the arrearages. R824.
In July 2014, the partners moved Brewhaha to a new location and changed
the name to Gusto. R822. However, Bryce was ultimately unable to save the
business or his father’s investment; Gusto closed in early 2015. R826. Before
then, Bryce had started to make regular payments. R826.
Bryce’s actions were based on his understanding that his father wanted the
business to succeed and that Highland Cove was willing to work with him on the

Mr. Tower testified that although he recalled speaking to Bryce about the bills
and the business, he did not recall any agreement to defer payments. R541-42,
546, 553.
3
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arrearages. R819, 826. It was also based on his understanding that David had
authorized him, in the power of attorney, to manage his finances, and that David
approved of his actions. R828, 844; State’s Ex. 24.
A public guardian was appointed in October 2014. R567. Bryce provided
the guardian with David’s financial information. R570. Bryce unsuccessfully
tried to get the guardian to pay certain bills and the guardian refused. R571-72,
575-76, 828. David told Bryce that he wanted him to remain in control. R828.
For that reason, Bryce attempted to regain control of David’s finances to ensure
his bills were paid. R828. The State presented no evidence that David’s
standard of living actually suffered. David’s bills were brought current and he
continued to live at Highland Cove. R969. B
B. Summary of Procedings.
On December 5, 2015, David was charged with two counts of abuse,
neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, and two counts of unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary, all second degree felonies from October 31, 2013—the
date David checked into Highland Cove—to October 31, 2014. R1-5. The
information was amended to one count of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a
vulnerable adult, and one count of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary,
both second degree felonies from October 31, 2013 to February 1, 2015. R89-93,
R135-37, 163-64.
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Motion to Dismiss. Before trial, trial counsel moved to have the charge
dismissed on the basis that Section 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) was unconstitutionally
vague. R174-184. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) (“A person commits
the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult when the person: unjustly or
improperly uses or manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or
advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult.”). Trial counsel argued
that, like a similar Florida law declared unconstitutional, Utah’s use of the words
“unjustly or improperly” to describe prohibited conduct was too vague to give
defendants notice. R175-83; R304-311. The trial court deferred ruling on that
motion until after trial. R324; R950-960. After trial, the State argued that Bryce
could not show the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
R282-300. The trial court ruled that the statute was constitutional “under the
facts and circumstances of this case” as applied to Bryce and facially. R959.
Expert Testimony. The State provided notice of just one expert
witness—Perrine Anderson, a nurse practitioner, who the State expected to testify
to David’s treatment plan and mental health. R152-56. Two of the State’s lay
witnesses—Kimberly Mack and Cory Tower—also provided expert testimony to
that effect at trial. R152-56. Mr. Tower’s testimony came after the trial court
instructed him that he could only testify as to his personal knowledge. R534.
Trial counsel objected to Mr. Tower’s opinion testimony but withdrew that
objection based on his psychology degree. R538-39. No objection was raised to
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Ms. Mack’s opinion testimony as to David’s mental capacity, including on dates
on which she did not observe him, which was based on her training and
experience. R668, 678-79, 682-83.
404(b) Evidence. The State did not provide Bryce notice of any 404(b)
evidence. R41. Although the probable cause statement and preliminary hearing
did not mention it, the State planned to introduce evidence that Bryce spent
$20,000 on his father’s credit card in fall 2014 and other evidence. R374. Before
trial, counsel argued that the information alleged “only the non-payment of
money to the assisted living home” and other evidence of where Bryce used the
money should be excluded because the State failed to provide the requisite Rule
404(b) notice. R365-66. The State argued that none of the evidence related to
the charged conduct from October 31, 2013 to February 1, 2015 was 404(b)
evidence. R169-70, R367. The trial court ruled that the State would be limited to
evidence within the scope of discovery and the amended information:
“Anything that was not turned over in discovery is not going to be
admissible.… If it’s relevant to what’s charged in the information,
then it’s admissible. If it is … evidence of other bad acts outside the
scope of what’s charged in the information, then I will hear an
argument that it’s not admissible because you didn’t give the 404(b)
notice that you were required to do because the defense asked for it
and they were entitled to it.”
R375 (emphasis added). During trial, the State introduced two key pieces of
evidence of Bryce’s conduct that feel outside the scope of what was charged in the
information.
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First, the State introduced evidence from an eviction proceeding in which
Bryce asserted that David lacked capacity to sign a lease in March 2013—roughly
six months before the charged conduct occured. R735-38; State’s Ex. 23. Bryce
and David both signed the lease for the building where Brewhaha would be
located. State’s Ex. 23. To protect David from the eviction proceeding, Bryce
took David’s name off of the LLC, and asserted that David was not a proper
defendant because he lacked capacity to sign the lease. R735-38, 807-08.
Although David’s signature was required on the lease, he was not an owner of the
LLC that was formed to rent the building. R735-38, 838.
The State used this evidence of a prior act to assert in opening and closing
arguments that Bryce was dishonest: “The judge has instructed you. If he lies on
one occasion … whether he’s competent or incompetent six months later, you can
disregard all of his testimony.” R877; R501-502. The State also used the lease to
argue that Bryce knew he was not acting in David’s best interest: “Was he really
looking out for his dad’s interest when he had his dad sign the lease and was he
competent? …. Having his father sign the Brewhaha lease, which is described as a
horrible lease.” R877-879.
Next, trial counsel stipulated to the State’s introduction of unauthenticated
hearsay evidence of a ledger sheet titled “Loans to David Bryce Jones”
purportedly denoting loans made from 1998 to 2000 but no payments made on
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them. R685-86; State’s Ex. 20. There was no limiting instruction given. R228246.
C.

Disposition.

Mr. Jones was tried by a jury on June 27 and June 28, 2017. He was
convicted of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult and of unlawful
dealing of property by a fiduciary, both second degree felonies. R252-253, R265.
He was sentenced on September 14, 2018. R324-26. He timely appealed. R328.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in failing to object to improper expert opinion testimony by lay
witness, 404(b) evidence that was introduced despite the trial court’s pretrial
ruling, and in stipulating to a jury instruction that lowered the State’s burden of
proof. Individually, or collectively, these objectively unreasonable actions by trial
counsel prejudiced Bryce by allowing the State to unfairly bolster its case with
evidence that played up David’s incapacity, while strongly suggesting that Bryce
was dishonest and had a propensity to take out loans without paying them back.
It also allowed the State to lessen its burden of proof from knowing to reckless on
the element of Bryce’s awareness of the purported substantial risk of loss.

The verdict form, sentencing minutes, and notice of appeal are reproduced in
Addendum B.
4
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Unconstitutionally Vague Statute. The trial court erred in its ruling
that the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute is not unconstitutionally vague
on its face or as applied to Bryce. The statute uses the vague terms “improper”
and “unjust” to define when it is illegal to use a vulnerable adult’s resources for
someone other than a vulnerable adult. Because of the subjective meaning of
those terms, the statute provides virtually no notice of what conduct might be
barred. It also did not fairly apprise Bryce of what conduct of his the State
considered to be unjust or improper.
Insufficient Evidence. Bryce also believes the evidence was insufficient
to convict him because he did not know that he breached his duty to David or
otherwise managed his resources unjustly or improperly, or that he knew of a
substantial risk of loss.
Merger. Bryce’s two convictions should merge because he was convicted
of two second degree felonies for just one crime. The only evidence presented to
the jury supported just one conviction and the State did not argue that there were
any independent elements for either crime.
ARGUMENT

I.

TRIAL
COUNSEL
INEFFECTIVE

WAS

CONSTITUIONALLY

“The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution” guarantees the
accused “‘the right to effective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
-13-

182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14
(1970) (additional citation omitted). A defendant’s right to effective assistance is
denied when counsel’s performance falls “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”
when considering the “totality of the evidence [and] taking into account such
factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record.” Id. at
694-96. It does not require a defendant to show that counsel’s deficient
representation “more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Rather, the standard is met if counsel’s ineffective
assistance can render the proceeding “unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself
unfair.” Id. at 694.
“‘An error is prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the
law.’” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 41, 274 P.3d 992 (quoting State v.
Penn, 2004 UT App 212, ¶ 28, 94 P.3d 308). “A court must ‘consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury’ and then ‘ask if the defendant has met
the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have
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been different absent the errors.’” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at at 695-96).
Bryce received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and was prejudiced
as a result. His trial counsel stipulated to erroneous jury instructions, failed to
object to the admission of other acts evidence despite a pre-trial ruling that it
would be excluded, and did not object to two expert testimony by two State lay
witnesses.
A. It was ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error to not
object to the expert testimony of Kimberly Mack and Cody
Tower.
A lay witness may only give an opinion if it is “rationally based on the
witness's perception;” “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony
or to determining a fact in issue;” and “not based on scientific, technical, other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Utah R. Evid. 701. It is
well-settled that if “testimony, ‘opinion or otherwise,’ is based on ‘scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge,’ it is within the scope of rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence and may not be admitted as lay fact testimony.” State v.
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 20, 147 P.3d 1176 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702);
accord Ladd v. Bowers Trucking, Inc., 2011 UT App 355, ¶ 13, 264 P.3d 752
(“Lay witnesses can testify only to matters of which they have personal
knowledge.”). The State must give defendant notice of expert testimony. See
Utah Code Ann § 77-17-13(1). Failure to do so, entitles the defendant to a
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continuance, or appropriate sanctions including excluding the testimony “if a
party deliberately violated” the notice requirement. Id. § 77-17-13(5). Generally
speaking, expert testimony is not admissible unless the proponent can show that
it “will assist the trier of fact and that the expert is qualified in the methods
employed,” and that “the principles or methods employed are reliable, have been
reliably applied, and are based upon sufficient facts or data.” State v.
Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 35, 318 P.3d 1221 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702; Haupt
v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 25, 131 P. 3d 252).
The State gave Bryce pretrial notice as to only one expert witness, Perrine
Anderson, a nurse practitioner, who the State expected to testify to David’s
treatment plan and mental health. R152-56. Yet, at trial, the State also
introduced expert opinion testimony as to David’s mental capacity through two
lay witnesses—Kimberly Mack and Cory Tower. Trial counsel unreasonably
failed to hold the state to its burden “to establish that the testimony will assist the
trier of fact and that the expert is qualified in the methods employed.”
Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 35.
This improper use of lay witnesses to provide expert opinion testimony
improperly bolstered the State’s position that David lacked the mental capacity to
agree to fund the restaurant or knowingly sign documents, and was harmful to
Bryce because it tended to discredit Bryce and other witnesses who based on their
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own observations believed David to be engaged and supportive of Bryce and the
restaurant.5
1. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to Kimberly Mack’s
improper opinion testimony.
The State called Kimberly Mack, a social worker for Adult Protective
Services, to testify as a lay witness. Ms. Mack met David Jones only once, on
September 26, 2014, and conducted a cognitive assessment. R668, 686. Based
on that one meeting, Ms. Mack testified that David had “significant memory
impairment.” R668. Despite having only met David once, Ms. Mack also
testified that, based on her experience, David “did not have the capacity” to sign a
letter authorizing Bryce to take out loans on November 26, 2013—nearly a year
before she met him. R678-79. She also testified that David lacked capacity to
sign a document on January 9, 2015. R682-83.
Ms. Mack’s opinion as to the results of David’s cognitive test were almost
certainly based on her specialized training. Moreover, her opinions as to David’s
capacity on two occasions when she did not see him are not reasonably based on
her own personal observations, but was by her own admission based on her
knowledge and experience in her field. R678-79.
As stated, lay witnesses cannot give opinions that are not based on their
personal observations. See Utah R. Evid. 701 (requiring lay witness opinion

5

The transcripts relevant to this argument are reproduced in Addendum C.
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testimony to be “rationally based on the witness’s perception”); State v. Sellers,
2011 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 248 P.3d 70 (lay witness’s testimony as to defendant’s level
of intoxication on a certain date was improper because it was “not based on her
own personal observation of him”); State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, ¶
26 n. 5.
It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object to this
testimony, first because failing to hold the State to its burden in introducing
expert testimony was a failure “to make reasonable investigation or inquiry.”
Thompson 2014 UT App 14, ¶¶ 36-37 (objectively unreasonable to not inquire
into expert’s qualifications or report foundation where testimony hurt
defendant’s case). And, “the failure to object to inadmissible evidence may
constitute deficient performance under some circumstances.” Id. ¶ 36; accord
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶¶ 24, 33, 247 P.3d 344 (objectively unreasonable to not
object to introduction of portions of victim impact statement at capital
sentencing hearing). Here, trial counsel’s failure to object to Ms. Mack’s
unqualified expert opinion testimony cannot be said to be a reasonable strategic
decision because the testimony bolstered the State’s position that David was
incompetent while offering additional testimony that tended to discredit Bryce’s
testimony that David wanted to invest in the restaurant. Moreover, “trial counsel
was not in a position to weigh the relative risks of objecting against the need to
object without at least investigating whether [Ms. Mack] was qualified and
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whether there was adequate foundation for” her opinion as to David’s capacity.
See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 42 (citing State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 83,
152 P.3d 321; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003)).6
2. It was objectively unreasonable to stipulate to Cody Tower’s
improper opinion testimony.
Likewise, there was no reasonable strategic reason to concede to Cody
Tower’s expert opinion testimony as to David’s ability to understand a document
in which he gave Bryce permission to take out loans simply because had
“psychology training.”7 R561-62. Like Ms. Mack, Mr. Tower’s was listed as a lay
witness, and his preliminary hearing testimony focused solely on the financial
evidence, providing Bryce with no notice that he could be called as an expert.

The failure by the trial court to intervene constituted plain error, which
requires showing obvious, harmful error. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶15, 361
P.3d 104. As a lay witness, Ms. Mack could not offer expert opinion, unless
“qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable statutory commands must then be
followed with respect to that testimony.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App
226, ¶ 20, 95 P.3d 1193 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702). A trial court should
intervene only where there is no “conceivable strategic purpose … to support the
use of the evidence.” State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 26, 322 P.3d 697. Because it is
well-settled that lay witnesses cannot provide expert opinion, and because there
is no conceivable strategic basis why trial counsel would not object it should have
been obvious to the trial court to intervene and exclude the evidence.
6

Neither trial counsel nor Mr. Tower corrected the prosecutor’s calling him a
psychiatrist, which unlike psychology requires a medical degree.
7
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As with Ms. Mack’s testimony, trial counsel’s stipulation to Mr. Tower’s
expert opinion relieved the State of its burden to show that his opinion would be
helpful to the jury, that he was qualified in the methods employed, and that those
methods are reliable. See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14 ¶ 35. As there was no
evidence presented as to whether Mr. Tower had any specialized training into
whether a patient such as David could understand certain things, trial counsel
waived all ability to investigate and also allowed damaging testimony to be
introduced without objection. See, e.g., Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 36. It was
therefore objectively unreasonable to stipulate to the unqualified expert opinion
of Mr. Tower.
3. The expert testimony presented by Ms. Mack and Mr. Tower
prejudiced Bryce.
To show prejudice, Bryce must show that there is a reasonable probability
that the deficient performance is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688, 694. The plain error harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test for
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah
1993)).
Here, the State had already introduced detailed evidence through the epert
testimony of Perrine Anderson as to David’s capacity. The additional improper
expert opinion testimony by two lay witnesses as to David’s capacity prejudiced
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Bryce by lending credibility to the State’s position that David lacked capacity due
to progressive dementia during the entire period in question, including by
providing Ms. Mack’s unqualified expert opinion that David lacked capacity to
sign a letter authorizing Bryce to take out loans on November 26, 2013—nearly a
year before Ms. Mack met him. R678-79. She also testified that David lacked
capacity to sign a document on January 9, 2015. R682-83. Mr. Tower’s
unqualified expert opinion that David would have a hard time understanding a
document was likewise damaging. R561-62. These two opinions bolstered the
State’s argument that Bryce was able to used David’s dementia to his advantage.
In closing rebuttal, the State pointed to the testimony of “professionals” to argue
that “[t]here’s no question that this man had significant, significant dementia.”
R896, 899. The State added: “[T]here’s a lot of evidence, maybe too much, and
maybe we did a little overkill, but I don’t think there’s any question about his
level of dementia.” R899.
Because the State used the improper expert opinion testimony to bolster its
case that, despite Bryce and his witness’s lay testimony, it was undisputed by
“professionals” that David lacked capacity. This is “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture.” See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
B. It was ineffective to not object to 404(b) evidence despite
the trial court’s ruling on the matter.
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The State did not provide Bryce notice of 404(b) evidence as required by
Rule 404(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. R41; R375. The trial court ruled that
because the State did not provide notice of the 404(b) evidence, “If it is …
evidence of other bad acts outside the scope of what’s charged in the information,
then I will hear an argument that it’s not admissible because you didn’t give the
404(b) notice that you were required to do because the defense asked for it and
they were entitled to it.” R375.
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in conformity with the character.” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Although such
evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
or lack of accident,” the prosecutor must give notice of such evidence to the
defendant on request. See id. R. 404(b)(2). Thus, although bad act evidence is
admissible “to show any element of the alleged crime,” it should be excluded if
“the sole reason it is being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a
person acted in conformity with that character.” State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694,
700 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
As stated, the State introduced two key pieces of evidence of Bryce’s prior
bad acts at trial:
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 From December of 1998 to March of 2000, Bryce apparently took
out loans, and there is no record of repayment. R685-86; State’s Ex. 20. Trial
counsel stated he had no objection. R686.
 In March 2013, Bryce and David both signed the lease for the
building where Brewhaha would be located. R735-38. As a result of eviction
proceedings, Bryce took David’s name off of the LLC to protect him and
asserted that David lacked capacity to sign the lease. R735-38, 807-08; supra
pp. 10-11.8
These examples of Bryce’s other acts went unchallenged by trial counsel
despite the trial court’s ruling that it would evaluate such evidence under Rule
404(b) and would be inclined to exclude evidence of Bryce’s other acts that fell
outside of the timeframe for the charged conduct due to the State’s failure to give
notice. 9
1. It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object to
the evidence of purported prior unpaid loans.

8

The relevant transcript pages and exhibit are reproduced in Addendum D.

Given the trial court’s pretrial ruling related to the 404(b) evidence, trial
counsel should have at least held the State to its burden to show that it should be
admitted despite not providing rule 404(b) notice, and that it would otherwise be
admissible for a non-character purpose under the rule 403 balancing. See, e.g.,
State v. Corona, 2018 UT App 154, ¶ 26.
9
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The evidence of apparently unpaid loans from David to Bryce from 1998 to
2000—a decade before the charged conduct—is a quintessential example of an
unproven allegation of prior similar conduct that is inadmissible. 10 See Utah R.
Evid. 404(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) (“The
threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence
under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other
than character.”); State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1978) (“The rules
of evidence require rejection of evidence of specific behavior to prove a character
trait except evidence of conviction of crime.”); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134,
137 (Utah App. 1989) (“Evidence which goes to general disposition or that is
unfairly prejudicial is not admissible.”). Here, despite the trial court’s pretrial
ruling, defense counsel inexplicably stated he had no objection to the admission
of an unauthenticated ledger.
There is no conceivable reason why trial counsel would argue that 404(b)
evidence should be excluded, then stipulate to its admission particularly where
the evidence served only to portray Bryce as having a propensity to not pay back
his loans. This is not a case where “defense counsel made an affirmative decision

The ledger sheet titled “Loans to David Bryce Jones” is also an unauthenticated
hearsay statement. See Utah R. Evid. 901 (requiring authentication of evidence).
Although it is strongly insinuated from the testimony that the ledger was a
notation of David’s loans to Bryce, there was no testimony from anyone as to who
wrote the ledger, let alone as to whether it actually represented loans from David
to Bryce.
10
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from the outset to utilize the 404(b) evidence to attack the State's case. See, e.g,.
State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 697. Rather, it is a case where trial
counsel failed argue against the admission of damaging evidence of the same
nature that he sought before trial to exclude. This cannot be said to be a “sound”
trial strategy. See e.g. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 1136
(objectively unreasonable to not object to argument based on previously excluded
“inflammatory and prejudicial” evidence).
2. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to admission of the
lease agreement.
This evidence was another example of a prior act that should have been
subject to the trial court’s 404(b) ruling. The State used evidence of Bryce’s
specific behavior some six months before the charged conduct allegedly occurred
to show that Bryce was dishonest and to generally show his bad character.
Given the trial court’s pretrial ruling as to 404(b) evidence there was no
conceivable basis to not object under Rules 404(b) and 608, Utah Rules of
Evidence.11 The evidence that Bryce had previously testified that David lacked
capacity to sign a lease well before the charged conduct occurred was particularly
damaging to Bryce’s credibility while also allowing the State to again attack
Bryce’s character. Again, this cannot be said to be a reasonable trial strategy

Rule 608 prohibits the use of “extrinsic evidence … to prove specific instances
of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for
truthfulness.”
11
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where trial counsel had previously sought to exclude this evidence. See e.g.
Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 22.
3. Trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Bryce.
To show prejudice from the 404(b) evidence, Bryce must show that there is
a reasonable probability that the deficient performance is “sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. 12
Here, not only did the State elicit 404(b) evidence despite the trial court’s
pretrial ruling, it also argued in closing that Bryce had a habit of violating his
duties to David, for example by signing a lease while incompetent: “Was he really
looking out for his dad’s interest when he had his dad sign the lease and was he
competent?” R876; R879 (“Having his father sign the Brewhaha lease, which is
described as a horrible lease.”) The State also used this evidence to attack
Bryce’s credibility. “The judge has instructed you. If he lies on one occasion …
whether he’s competent or incompetent six months later, you can disregard all of
his testimony.” R877. The prosecutor went on to argue that by previously arguing

Given the pretrial rule 404(b) ruling, the failure by the trial court to
intervene constituted plain error, which requires showing obvious, harmful error.
See Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶15. A trial court should intervene only where there is no
“'conceivable strategic purpose' … to support the use of the evidence.” State v.
Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 26, 322 P.3d 697. And the test for harm is the same as the
test for prejudice under Strickland.
12
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that David was incompetent to sign the lease, Bryce had intentionally deceived
the court—This was an intentional act to draft a pleading to tell the court of law
that his father was incompetent. Six months later … he testifies under oath at the
APS hearing saying he is competent.” R877. In rebuttal the State again used this
evidence, “we know he lied, at least on one occasion, and that was he either lied
when he said his father couldn’t even understand the eviction proceedings … or
he was completely competent at the time he signed these letters in January of
2015.” R895. In addition there was no limiting instruction given to direct the
jury as to how to consider the 404(b) evidence.
These were not “fleeting statements” and no curative instruction was given.
See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 46, 24 P.3d 948 (testimony that victim always
wore alarm when defendant was around was “an isolated, off-hand remark”);
State v. Yalowski, 2017 UT App 177, ¶¶ 18, 22 (victim’s statement that defendant
was “just constantly fighting with [her]. Getting violent” was fleeting and lacked
detail). Rather, the testimony was intentionally elicited by the State and changed
the entire evidentiary picture by painting Bryce as dishonest, and by showing that
he had a propensity to take advantage of his father through conduct that was
virtually identical to the charged conduct. See State v. Landon, 2014 UT App 91,
¶ 6 (no prejudice from prior “warrant arrest, without additional information
about the general character of the crime or the existence of a conviction”). Here,
the other acts evidence strongly favored the State’s version of events and painted
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Bryce as not credible. “[T]he possibility that [Bryce’s] conviction reflected the
jury's assessment of his character, rather than the evidence of the crime he was
charged with, is not insubstantial.” Rackham, 2016 UT App 167, ¶ 24. Its
admission therefore undermines confidence in the verdict. See id.; accord State
v. Leber, 2010 UT App 387, ¶ 19, 246 P.3d 163 (other acts evidence prejudicial
where it undermined defendant’s credibility and “the evidence presented at trial
was not clearly supportive of either [the State’s or defendant’s] version of
events”). In sum “‘in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for” Bryce. See State v. Rackham, 2016
UT App 167, ¶ 24, 381 P.3d 1161 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271
(Utah 1998).

C.

Trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to an
erroneous jury instruction.

Where counsel stipulates to erroneous instructions, this Court will review
them “under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine.” State v. Malaga,
2006 UT App 103, ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 703; accord State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 48
(same). To show deficient performance, Bryce must show that the jury
instruction erroneously lowered the State’s burden of proof. See State v.
Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 78 (citing Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 27) (holding
failure to object to instruction that “effectively lowered the State’s burden of proof
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… cannot be considered reasonable trial strategy”). To show prejudice, Bryce
must show that considering “the totality of the evidence at trial,” the “‘jury could
reasonably have found’ the facts in [Bryce’s] favor ‘such that a failure to instruct
the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.’” See Apodaca, 2018 UT
App 131, ¶ 78 (quoting Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42).
1. It was unreasonable to stipulate to Jury Instruction 31 because it
improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof.
This Court reviews “jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law.” 13
State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quoting State v. Malaga,
2006 UT App 103, ¶ 18, 132 P.3d 703). It is axiomatic that “our criminal code
requires proof of mens rea for each element of a non-strict liability crime.” State
v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 26, 349 P.3d 676. Thus, to accurately instruct on the
law, jury instructions must state the mens rea that is required for each element.
For example, a rape instruction must state the mens rea required for the element
of sexual intercourse and for the element of nonconsent. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶
26 (quoting State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, ¶ 23, 219 P.3d 75). Likewise,
an instruction on second degree felony child abuse must require that the jury find
a defendant “had the requisite intent or knowledge to cause the victim serious
physical injury.” See O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 41.

13

The jury instructions are reproduced in Exhibit E.
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Instruction No. 31 did not instruct the jury on the appropriate mental state
because it allowed the jury to convict Bryce if it believed he acted recklessly,
which is a lesser mental state than the knowing mental state required by statute.
See id. A “knowing” mental state requires that a person “is aware of the nature
of his conduct or the existing circumstances” and “when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2).
A “reckless” mental state requires only that a person “is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur,” i.e. “a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as view from the
actor’s standpoint.” Id. § 76-2-103(3).
As charged, the unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary statute requires
that to be guilty, a person must:
deal[] with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or
property of a governmental entity, public money, or of a financial
institution, in a manner which the person knows is a violation of the
person’s duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property
was entrusted.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2) (emphasis added). Jury Instruction 31 however
only required the knowing mental state be attached to one element: the “violation
of the person’s duty.” R238. It allowed Bryce to be convicted based on mere
reckless as to whether the alleged conduct “involves substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was
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entrusted.” Id. As will be shown, a plain reading of the statute in context, along
with the legislative intent, show that to be guilty a defendant must know that he is
in violation of his duty and must know that his actions involve a substantial risk
of loss to the owner or person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
“‘When interpreting a statute, this court's paramount concern is to give
effect to the legislative intent, manifested by the plain language of the
statute.’” Utah State Eng'r v. Johnson (In re Gen. Determination), 2018 UT App
109, ¶ 22 (quoting Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d
666 (quotation simplified)). The Court assumes, “‘absent a contrary indication,
that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually
accepted meaning,’ and [it presumes] ‘that the expression of one term should be
interpreted as the exclusion of another" and "seek to give effect to omissions in
statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.’” Id. (quoting
Aequitas Enters., LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d
923 (quotation simplified)). The Court also reads “‘the plain language of a
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions
in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters.’” Id. (quoting H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 32, 203 P.3d 943).
Here, the plain language of Section 76-6-513, when read in harmony with
other provisions of the statute and related chapters is that the legislature
intended for the knowing mental state to attach to the element of “involves a
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substantial risk of loss.…” As stated, a fiduciary cannot be charged unless he
handles property in such a way that he “knows is a violation of the person’s duty
and which involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a
person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6513.
The “and” connects the “substantial risk of loss” element to the “violation
of duty” element, including the knowing mental state. When taken in the
broader context, it becomes more clear that the legislature intended for the
knowledge element to be imparted to the “substantial risk of loss.” Unlawful
dealing by a fiduciary” appears in Part 5 —the “fraud” section—of Chapter 6 of the
Utah Criminal Code. See § 76-6-412. It is punished according to the theft statute,
Utah Code Section 76-6-412. See id. Fraud and theft both implicate purposeful
deprivations of property, i.e., that a defendant must know that his conduct results
in a loss (or substantial risk of loss) to the owner. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 2011
UT App 366, ¶ 10 (acknowledging theft by receiving requires a defendant knows
or believes property to be stolen); State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (“The evidence must show that the defendant knew or believed the
property was stolen and that he acted purposely to deprive the owner of
possession of the property.”); State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, ¶ 8, 38 P.3d
982 (reversing forgery conviction where the evidence was insufficient to show
defendant had purpose to defraud or knowledge of facilitating fraud). Indeed,
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the first definition for fraud in Black’s Law Dictionary is “A knowing
misrepresentation of the truth to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”
Blacks Law Dict. Eighth Ed. 685 (2004) and the first definition of “theft” is “[t]he
felonious taking and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of
depriving the true owner of it.” Id. at 1516. That the statute does not actually
require any loss suggests that the legislature intended a more culpable mental
state. See, e.g., State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985) (upholding theft
by receiving statute’s “belief” that property is probably stolen as an element, in
part because the statute “proscribes a higher degree of misconduct. It requires
the union of the culpable mental state and all the steps within the actor's power
to complete the intended theft.).
In addition, at least one state has interpreted a statute with the same
language to require the defendant know the substantial risk of loss be knowing.
The New Hampshire misapplication statute to require three elements: “(1) the
property was entrusted to the defendant as a fiduciary; (2) the defendant dealt
with the entrusted property in a manner which he knew constituted a breach of
his fiduciary duty; and (3) the defendant dealt with the entrusted property in a
manner which he knew involved a substantial risk of loss to the owner of the
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property or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. State v.
Merski, 123 NH 564, 568 (NH 1983) (interpreting NH Rev. Stat. § 638:11 14).
Finally, Utah’s statute was modeled after the Model Penal Code’s parallel
statute, section 224.13. Although the Utah statute does not follow the Model
Penal Code verbatim, it “remains very similar to Model Penal Code section
224.13.”15 State v. Winward, 904 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);accord
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 195 (Utah 1987) (analyzing Model Penal Code
commentaries where “there exists no meaningful legislative history concerning”
the Utah Code section that was “modeled after a similar provision” of the Model
Penal Code). The commentary to Section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code
stresses that it applies only to a fiduciary “who applies or disposes of entrusted
property in a manner known to be unlawful and to involve substantial risk of loss
or detriment to the beneficiary,” i.e. knows that the conduct is both unlawful and
involving a substantial risk of loss.

“A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he deals with property that has been
entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a financial
institution, in a manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which
involves substantial risk of loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the
property was entrusted.” NH Rev. Stat. § 638:11.
14

“A person commits an offense if he applies or disposes of property that has
been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a
financial institution, in a manner which he knows is unlawful and involves
substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to a person
for whose benefit the property was entrusted.” Model Penal Code of American
Law Institute section 224.13.
15
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In sum, the Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary Statute requires a knowing
mental state as to the element of substantial risk of loss, and Jury Instruction 31
lowered the State’s burden of proof. It was therefore objectively unreasonable for
trial counsel to stipulate to that instruction. See Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 76.
2. There is a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury
instruction impacted the outcome.
To show prejudice, Bryce must show that had a proper instruction been
given, in the context of the “evidence before the jury and whether the jury could
have found [that Bryce did not know of a substantial risk of loss] such that a
failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.” See
Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42.
Bryce was convicted of Unlawful dealing by a fiduciary based on evidence
that he used his father’s funds to open and run a business, rather than using
those funds to pay for the assisted living facility. In the context of the totality of
the evidence, the jury could have improperly convicted Bryce based on a finding
of mere recklessness as to whether his actions cased a “substantial risk of loss or
detriment” to David. For example, Bryce testified that he and David both
planned to open a restaurant together. R806. When the restaurant suffered a
setback due to not getting a liquor license, Bryce attempted to salvage his father’s
investment. R817-18, 820-21. Bryce’s testimony that he only did so after
reaching an agreement with Mr. Tower for deferred payments also supported that
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he did not know of a substantial risk of loss. R706, 823-24. In light of these
actions, a reasonable jury could have found that Bryce acted recklessly, but not
knowingly. The error therefore undermines confidence in the verdict. See
Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 78 (quoting Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42).
D. Cumulative Error.
This Court will reverse under the cumulative error doctrine “if the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair
trial was had.” State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 73, 318 P.3d 1221 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)) (omission in original). As
stated, prejudice is shown if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 (1984). Courts are more likely to
reverse “‘when a conviction is based on comparatively thin evidence’” and when
“the pivotal issue at trial was credibility of the witnesses and the errors went to
that central issue.” Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 73 (quoting State v. King,
2010 UT App 396, ¶ 35, 248 P.3d 984) (additional citations omitted); accord
State v. Havatone, 2008 UT App 133, ¶ 8, 183 P.3d 257 (“[W]hen taking [the
errors] together, we cannot say that a fair trial was had.”).
Here, the multiple instances of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of,
should undermine this Court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict and require
reversal. The jury was required to decide whether there was evidence to support
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a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryce’s use of David’s money to
start their joint business constituted knowingly using David’s finances for the
benefit of someone else, and whether in doing so, he knew there was a
substantial risk of loss or detriment to David. It also had to decide whether that
same use was an unjust and improper use of David’s money for the benefit of
someone other than David.

That decision came down to whether the jury

believed Bryce—that David wanted to invest in the restaurant and wanted it to
succeed, and that Bryce did everything he could to make the restaurant
profitable for David, and did not intentionally, knowingly or recklessly place his
father in risk.
Trial counsel unreasonably either stipulated to or failed to object to
evidence that corroborated the State’s case. Despite the trial court’s ruling as to
404(b) evidence, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the eviction
proceedings, and Bryce’s claims in that proceeding that his father lacked
capacity to sign a lease. Counsel also stipulated to the admission of a ledger
sheet that appeared to be evidence that Bryce had taken out loans from his
father in the past without paying them back.
Counsel also either stipulated to or failed to object to two lay witness’
opinion testimony that David lacked capacity—one of whom who met David only
once offered an expert opinion as to his capacity a year before she met him and a
few months later.
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Finally, the erroneous jury instruction could well have misled the jury into
convicting Bryce based on a reduced burden of proof.
The individual and cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of Bryce’s
trial counsel requires a reversal for a new trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THE ABUSE OF A VULNDERABLE ADULT STATUTE IS
NOT UNOCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE

“To survive a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must ‘(1) “define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement,” and (2) “establish minimal guidelines” that
sufficiently instruct law enforcement [so] as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”’” State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 54, 870 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 77, 137 P.3d 726;
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)); accord State v. MacGuire,
2004 UT 4, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 1171; State v. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, P31, 57 P.3d
977. “A statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the
facts of a given case.” State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854
(emphasis added). “Where, as here, a statute ‘implicates no constitutionally
protected conduct,’ a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge ‘only if the
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’” MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,
¶ 12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)).
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“[W]hen a party raises both facial and as-applied vagueness challenges,
"[a] court should . . . examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law." Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 5516 (quoting Vill. of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982))
(second alteration in original). “This is because ‘[a] plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed [by statute] cannot complain of the vagueness
of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’” Id. (alterations in original);
accord United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (same).
In reviewing such a challenge, this Court “‘presume[s] that the statute is
valid and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.’” Murray
City Corp. v. Robinson, 2014 UT App 107, ¶ 4, 326 P.3d 683 (quoting State v.
Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 1218). “It is not sufficient for the challenger to
merely ‘inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by

This issue is preserved because after briefing and argument, the trial court
ruled that the statute was constitutional on both as applied and facial grounds.
See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ¶¶10-12, 285 P.3d 1133 (issue preserved even
though appellant did not fully develop it because court had opportunity to
address it); State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ¶25 n.4, 37 P.3d 260
(addressing identity issue even though not specifically preserved because it was
part of the preserved probable cause issue). In the event that this Court deems
any part of Bryce’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statute to be
unpreserved, it may address constitutional issues not raised in the trial court
where the defendant’s liberty is at stake. See, e.g., State v. Breckenridge, 688
P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1983). Finally, if trial counsel did not preserve these
arguments, counsel’s performance falls “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 (1984).
16
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the normal reader.’” Id. (quoting Clearfield City v. Hoyer, 2008 UT App 226, ¶ 8,
189 P.3d 94).
As charged, to be found guilty of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a
vulnerable adult, the jury had to find that Bryce “unjustly or improperly used or
managed the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or benefit of someone
other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(iii) (emphasis
added); R237.
The trial court ruled that subsection (iii) of the exploitation statute was not
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Bryce because a defendant
could raise the defense that “it's not a criminal act if you do it in a just or proper
way.” R954. The trial court next ruled that the terms “improper or unjust” were
not unconstitutionally vague because they are “terms of ordinary and common
usage, juries understand those terms,” and because there was a mens rea
requirement–recklessness would not rise to the level of a second degree felony.
R955-56.
The trial court erred in its ruling that “unjust” and “improper” limited the
scope of who could be held culpable because the terms “unjust” and “improper”
are subjective terms, which in the context of the broad scope of subsection (iii) of
the statute could lead to charges against virtually anyone who uses a vulnerable
adult’s resources for the use of anyone other than the vulnerable adult. The
common meaning of “improper” is “not proper; not strictly belonging, applicable,
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correct, etc.; erroneous”; “not in accordance with propriety of behavior, manners,
etc.”; or “unsuitable or inappropriate, as for the purpose or occasion.”
Dictionary.com, available at www.dictionary.com/browse/improper; accord
Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/improper (defining “improper” as “not in accord with
fact, truth, or right procedure: INCORRECT”). And unjust means
“characterized by injustice: UNFAIR.” Merriam-Webster.com, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unjust. Both of these terms have very
subjective meanings. For example, if a jury found mere criminal negligence in a
single poor investment decision, it could convict a defendant based on that
conduct. Or, if one child asked a vulnerable adult child for help with paying
college tuition or purchasing a home from a vulnerable adult where that child’s
sibling had received no such assistance, such conduct could be seen as unfair or
unjust use of the vulnerable adult’s resources.
Other states have found similar language to be problematic. For example,
the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the definition of exploitation as “the
illegal or improper use of a vulnerable person or his resources for another's profit
or advantage, with or without the consent of the vulnerable adult” was
problematic, in part because of the undefined term “improper use.” Colburn v.
State, 201 So. 3d 462, 466-67 (Miss. 2016) (quoting Decker v. State, 66 So.3d 654
(Miss. 2011)). The Court reasoned that “a vulnerable adult cannot give a spouse
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permission to withdraw money from a checking account to buy herself a birthday
present; or give one of her children or grandchildren permission to withdraw
money to pay college tuition. … [B]oth these actions would constitute crimes.” Id.
(quoting Decker, 66 So.3d 654). A statutory amendment that defined both
“illegal use” and “improper use” cured the facial vagueness problem with the
statute. Id. at 469. Likewise the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Fla. Code §
415.111(5), which bars knowingly or willfully “exploit[ing] an aged person or
disabled adult by the improper or illegal use or management of the funds, assets,
property, power of attorney, or guardianship of such aged person or disabled
adult for profit,” was unconstituationally vague. Cuda v. State, 639 So. 2d 22, 23
& n.1 (Fla. 1994). This was because the statue provided “no clear explanation of
the proscribed conduct, no explicit definition of terms, nor any good faith
defense.” Id. at 25.
In contrast, Delaware’s similar statute which defined exploitation as "the
illegal or improper use or abuse of an infirm person, his resources or his rights,
by another person, whether for profit or other advantage" was not deemed
unconstitutional. See State v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Del.1994) (quoting 31
Del.C. § 3902(5) (1974)). That Court ruled that the exploitation statute had clear
intent language that recognized adults with physical or mental infirmity were
“‘subject to psychological or physical injury or exploitation’” and that the
“General Assembly, therefore, intends through this chapter to establish a system
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of services for impaired adults designed to protect their health, safety and
welfare.’” Id. (quoting Del. Code. Ann. Title 1250, § 3901).
As with the Mississippi and Florida statutes, Utah’s statute could be read
so broadly as to criminalize gifts from a vulnerable adult’s spouse to their child
because such gift would not be used for the vulnerable adult’s benefit and could
also be seen as improper, particularly if one sibling does not agree with a gift to
another sibling. Likewise, a good faith investment decision that turns out to be
unwise in retrospect could easily be seen as “improper,” and would also not
benefit the vulnerable adult. Unlike the Delaware statute, Utah’s has no clear
legislative intent. Also, unlike the Delaware statute, it does not modify
“improper” with “illegal,” a term with a more definite common meaning, which
when read in conjunction with “improper” and the indictment put defendants on
notice as to what conduct was proscribed. See Sailer, 684 A.2d at 1250 (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary, 747 (6th ed. 1990) as defining “illegal” as “against or not
authorized by law,” and quoting the American Heritage Dictionary 909 (3rd ed.
1992) as defining “improper” as “not in keeping with accepted standards of what
is right . . . often referring to unethical conduct” ).
The trial court erred in its reasoning because it found that by including the
terms “improper” and “unjust” as a perquisite for making a person’s conduct
illegal, the legislature provided a defense. The problem with this reasoning is
that–as the Mississippi and Florida courts noted—the limiting words are highly
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subjective. Indeed, subsection (iii) under which Bryce was charged appears to be
a catch-all, as unlike the other subsections, it does not require the person charged
to have any position of trust, any legal authority to act on behalf of the vulnerable
adult or any knowledge of the vulnerable adult’s incapacity to consent. See
generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(i)-(v). Although other terns such as
“position of trust” are defined, unjustly and unknowingly are not. Id. §76-5111(1). Indeed, even subsection (iv) at least limits the exploitation to misuse to
someone with legal authority and subsection (i) to require a “position of trust.”17
The failure to provide any limits to what conduct is prohibited fails to provide
notice as to what conduct is prohibited, and could lead to arbitrary enforcement.
For example, a spouse could become liable, even if acting without any knowledge
as to the vulnerable adult’s capacity, based only on criminal negligence. See id. §
76-5-111(4)(b). Thus, not only could the spouse of a vulnerable adult find herself
guilty for using “resources” of the vulnerable adult to pay college tuition for her
child, the child who receives the gift, i.e. the person who “uses” the resources
could also face criminal culpability. If a vulnerable adult purchased a car for his
child, the salesperson could face criminal culpability.
The statute is also vague as applied to Bryce because he was not put on
notice as to what conduct of his was prohibited as a lay person rather than as a

Bryce was originally charged under subsection (4)(a)(i), but the information
was later amended to subsection 4(a)(iii).
17
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fiduciary, nor was he put on notice with regard to any lay activity what conduct
constituted “improper or unjust” use or management of David’s resources. As a
result, this Court should reverse Bryce’s conviction on the basis that the
exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute is unconstitutionally vague both as
applied to him and facially.

III.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT
TO CONVICT MR. JONES OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT

“A defendant must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show
that the trial court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict.” State v.
Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶27, 345 P.3d 1168. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, this Court does “‘not sit as a second fact finder.’” SSalt Lake City v.
Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶ 10, 342 P.3d 212 (quoting State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146,
1150 (Utah 1991)). This Court views “the evidence and all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom … ‘in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict.’” Id. (quoting Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150). This Court “will overturn a
conviction only if the evidence ‘is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a
jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.’” Id.
(quoting Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150); accord State v. Thompson, 2017 UT App
183, ¶ 33, 405 P.3d 892 (quoting State v. Ring, 2013 UT App 98, ¶ 2, 300 P.3d
1291) (“‘So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
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which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.’”).18
As charged, to convict Bryce of unlawful dealing by a fiduciary, the jury had
to find that he knew the he had violated his fiduciary duty and that the breach
involved a substantial risk of loss. To convict Bryce of exploitation of a
vulnerable adult, the State had to prove that Bryce unjustly or improperly used or
managed the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of
someone other than the vulnerable adult. To carry his burden of persuasion on a
claim of insufficient evidence, Bryce may marshal the evidence that supports the
verdict, and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict. See Utah R. App. P. 24 2017 advisory
committee note (citing State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645). The evidence
presented at trial that supported the State’s case as to Bryce’s knowledge that he
breached his duty and/or that he improperly used or managed David’s resources
for the benefit of someone else, is as follows:
1. Bryce used David’s money to fund the restaurant and did not make regular
payments to Highland Cove from December 2013 to May 2014.
2. Cody Tower did not recall the arrangement with Bryce to defer payments.

This issue was preserved. See Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d
1168 (“When the specific ground for an objection is clear from its context, the
issue is preserved for appeal.”). To the extent it was not preserved, it may be
reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. See supra p. 39 n.
16.
18
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3. Heather Knight testified that she left messages for Bryce about payment
once a month. R523.
4. Highland Cove sent Bryce an eviction notice on May 23, 2014. R521.
Even if all the marshaled facts are true they do not support that Bryce knew
he was breaching his duty or otherwise improperly or unjustly managing his
father’s finances. Nor does it support that he knowingly created a substantial risk
of loss. Instead, ample evidence supports that Bryce was trying to help his father
have a successful and profitable restaurant business, and while doing so believed
that his actions were authorized by the power of attorney and by David’s desire
for the restaurant to succeed. In doing so, Bryce was not acting in the interest of
anyone but his father.
There is also no evidence that there was ever an actual substantial risk of loss.
Although the retirement home threatened eviction, testified that the home could
not evict David. R523. Thus, there was no substantial risk that David would
actually be evicted, i.e. suffer actual loss.
The evidence is therefore insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on this
count. See Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶ 28 (The evidence presented on the first factor
did not demonstrate, nor did it give rise to a reasonable inference, that Mr.
Miles's knife bore the character of a dangerous weapon as evidenced by any
inherent and uniquely weapon-like traits.”).
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IV.

TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY BY NOT
ARGUING FOR MERGER OF BRYCE’S CONVICTIONS

Both the United States and Utah Constitutions protect against twice
punishing a person for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art.
I., sec. 12. “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance where ‘a
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts to only one
offense’” by requiring the court to merge two convictions for the same offense
into one. sec. 12. “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance where ‘a
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts to only
one offense’” by requiring the Court to merge two convictions for the same
offense into one. sec. 12. “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance
where ‘a criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts
to only one offense’” by requiring the Court to merge two convictions for the
same offense into one. State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, ¶ 8, 344 P.3d 191
(quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 31, 128 P.3d 1179). 19 Thus, “when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act
shall be punishable under only one such provision.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(1). “If trial counsel fails to request the consolidation of charges under
the merger doctrine, and consolidation would be in order, trial counsel has failed

State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064, overruled the common law merger
doctrine, including the Finlayson-Lee test.
19
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to provide effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App
71, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 864 (citing State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶¶ 24-26, 994 P.2d
1243; State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d
236, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).
Generally, the merger doctrine applies to prevent punishment for both
lesser included offenses and greater offenses. Under this analysis, the Court first
determines “whether the lesser offense is ‘established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.’”
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Hill, 674
P.2d 96, 98 (Utah 1983)) “If the the two crimes are ‘such that the greater cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,’ then the lesser
offense ‘merges into the greater crime and the State cannot convict and punish
the defendant for both offenses.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 674 P.2d at 98) (additional
citation omitted); accord State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶ 10, 71 P.3d 624.
Although “comparison of the statutory elements” is generally sufficient, in cases
where “the two crimes have multiple variations,” the Court looks beyond the
statutory elements to “consider the evidence to determine whether the greaterlesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually
proved at trial." Id. (quoting Baker, 674 P.2d at 97).
For example, in Ross, the defendant was convicted of both communications
fraud and forgery for a single course of conduct that involved cashing forged
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checks. R237. This Court determined that Ross’s forgery convictions merged
with his communications fraud conviction under Utah Code Section 76-1-402(3)
because there was no separate factual basis for the convictions, particularly
where the jury was never asked to find a “communication” separate from passing
a forged check. See Ross, 951 P.2d at 245. “On the facts of this case, only element
two of communications fraud ("communication" to another person) and element
two of forgery ("utterance" of a forged check) are potentially independent of each
other” requiring merger “unless the jury was instructed on and the State proved
separate factual bases for the elements of ‘utterance’ and ‘communication.’” Id.
at 242. This Court therefore ruled merger was appropriate because “the only
theory the State actually put before the jury” did not distinguish between
“communication” and “utterance,” instead arguing that “the communication is
the check itself.” Id. at 245. Likewise, in State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ¶ 27,
989 P.2d 1065, the Supreme Court ruled that possession of controlled substance
was a lesser included offense of operating a methamphetamine laboratory where
“no special verdict form was employed” and it was possible the jury relied on
overlapping elements to convict. In contrast, merger is not required where there
is independent evidence to support both convictions. See, e.g., State v. Yanez,
2002 UT App 50, ¶ 21, (convictions for witness tampering and discharge of
firearm did not merge where there “was evidence other than the discharge of the

-50-

firearm upon which the jury could base defendant’s conviction for witness
tampering”).
Here, although the two statutes under which Bryce was convicted are
typically separate offenses, the State’s theory of the case provided no factual
distinction between the two charges. Bryce was charged with two separate
felonies for one course of conduct, both of which have multiple variations. Under
Section 76-6-513(2), “[a] person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a
fiduciary if the person deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a
fiduciary … in a manner which the person knows is a violation of the person's
duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a
person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.” Under Utah Code Section
76-5-111(4)(iii), “[a] person commits the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable
adult when the person … unjustly or improperly uses or manages the resources of
a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of someone other than the
vulnerable adult.”
Although the State charged Bryce with violating both statutes, the elements
overlap, particularly under the only theory advanced by the State—that Bryce
purportedly used his fiduciary position to use his father’s money for a purpose
other than caring for his father. See Ross, 951 P.2d at 285. There was no
separate factual basis for each either conviction. See id. The State apparently
originally charged Bryce under subsection (4)(a)(i) of the exploitation of a
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vulnerable adult statute, which required a “position of trust” but later amended to
subsection (4)(a)(iii). See R135 (Third amended information incorrectly stating
that a “position of trust and confidence” is required under subsection 4(a)(iii)).
The information did not differentiate between what conduct constituted unlawful
dealing by a fiduciary but not exploitation of a vulnerable adult or vice versa.
R169-70 (Fourth Amended Information). In arguing for a conviction on both
counts the State never argued that any of Bryce’s conduct violated only one of the
charged crimes. See, e.g., R897 (arguing that the power of attorney created “a
legal duty … a fiduciary duty” and tying that duty to David’s capacity). The
elements in this case thus overlap under the only theory advanced by the State.
The first element of Section 76-6-513, dealing “with property that has been
entrusted to him as a fiduciary in a manner which the person knows deals with
property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary … in a manner which the
person knows is a violation of the person's duty” overlaps with “unjustly or
improperly us[ing] or manag[ing] the resources of a vulnerable adult.” Because
the mismanagement alleged involved Bryce’s fiduciary duty to David, once the
jury determined that Bryce had knowingly violated his duty, it would necessarily
determine that he unjustly or improperly used or managed David’s resources.
Likewise, once the jury determined there was a “substantial risk of loss” to David,
it would necessarily determine that the resources were managed for the
advantage of someone else. The only independent elements were the finding of
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“vulnerable adult” and “fiduciary duty” but as stated, the State’s theory tied the
fiduciary duty to managing the resources, and it argued that Bryce was only able
to breach his duties because David was a vulnerable adult. See id.
Thus, as in Ross, Bryce’s convictions should be merged because the State
alleged just one course of conduct and did not argue that any of Bryce’s conduct
violated one statute but not the other. Trial counsel’s failure to argue for merger
was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Bryce respectfully requests that his convictions be
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with prejudice. Bryce
alternatively Bryce requests that the convictions against him be reversed and that
this Court remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Bryce requests that that
Court remand with an order to the trial court to merge his convictions.
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